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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v* : Case No. 930034-CA 
NUEL L. HARRIS, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated assault, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 
(1990), and attempted robbery, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101, 76-4-102, and 76-6-301 (1990). This 
Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f ) (1992) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the trial court commit reversible error by considering 
uncharged criminal conduct contained in defendant's presentence 
report when sentencing defendant pursuant to a plea bargain 
agreement? 
"'This Court does not disturb a sentence unless it exceeds 
that prescribed by law or unless the trial court has abused its 
discretion.' State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986); State 
v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887-88 (Utah 1978). An abuse of 
discretion may be manifest if the actions of the judge were 
'inherently unfair' or if the judge imposed a 'clearly excessive' 
sentence. State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887." State v. Strunk, 
205 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 17-18 (Utah 1993) (Hall C.J., dissenting). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
This case may be disposed of solely on the basis of caselaw. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In August of 1992, defendant and three other individuals were 
charged with aggravated sexual assault, forcible sodomy, and 
aggravated robbery (R. 06-08). Defendant waived his preliminary 
hearing and was bound over to district court, where he entered a 
plea of not guilty (R. 03, 16-17). On November 30th, after the 
trial court granted defendant's motion to withdraw his plea of not 
guilty, defendant entered a guilty plea to one count of aggravated 
assault and one count of attempted robbery (R. 26-27). On December 
28th, defendant was sentenced to two consecutive zero to five year 
terms at the Utah State Prison (R. 36-37). He then filed a timely 
appeal (R. 39). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The underlying factual scenario in this case involved four 
men, all transients, who forcibly sexually assaulted and robbed a 
woman, also a transient, at a motel in Salt Lake County (R. 74-76). 
All four men originally were charged with aggravated sexual 
assault, forcible sodomy, and aggravated robbery (R. 06-07). In 
defendant's case, the charges were reduced to one count each of 
aggravated assault and attempted robbery, in exchange for his plea 
of guilty (R. 26-27). The trial court then sentenced defendant to 
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two consecutive zero to five year terms in the Utah State Prison 
(R. 36-37). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State concedes that the trial court, in sentencing 
defendant, improperly considered the criminal charges that had been 
dismissed as a result of defendant's plea bargain with the State. 
However, because the court's sentence fell within the limits of 
what was permissible for the crimes that were actually charged and 
because the court stated sufficient and appropriate reasons, 
totally apart from the improper considerations, for the sentence it 
imposed, the sentence should be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
IN SENTENCING DEFENDANT, THE TRIAL COURT 
IMPROPERLY CONSIDERED CRIMINAL CHARGES WHICH 
HAD BEEN DISMISSED AS A RESULT OF DEFENDANT'S 
PLEA BARGAIN WITH THE STATE. 
The State concedes that, in sentencing defendant, the trial 
court erred in considering the unproven charges which had been 
dismissed as a result of defendant's plea bargain with the State. 
Defendant's plea only admitted the facts constituting the lesser 
crime, as stated in the plea agreement. His plea "does not 
presuppose the truth of the facts pleaded in the [information]." 
People v. Griffin, 166 N.E.2d 684, 199 N.Y.S.2d 674, 7 N.Y.2d 511, 
515-16 (1960). 
When defendant entered the plea to the lesser charges of 
aggravated assault and attempted robbery, he did so in exchange for 
giving up his right to have a jury determine his guilt or innocence 
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on the original charges of aggravated sexual assault, forcible 
sodomy, and aggravated robbery. In essence, he gave up that right 
only on the condition that the original charges be dismissed. See 
State v. Womack, 319 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 1982). Dismissal of criminal 
charges as part of a plea bargain is the functional equivalent of 
acquittal of the charges, which would preclude consideration of 
their underlying facts for the purpose of imposing sentence to the 
reduced charges. People v. Griffin, 7 N.Y.2d at 515. Accord 
People v. Harvey, 25 Cal.3d 754, 758, 159 Cal. Rptr. 696, 699 
(1979). 
Utah has dealt directly with this issue only in the context of 
a capital case, where the supreme court held "that the sentencing 
body -- be it judge or jury — may not rely on other violent 
criminal activity as an aggravating factor supporting a death 
penalty unless it is first convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the accused did commit the other crime." State v. Laffertv, 749 
P. 2d 1239, 1260 (Utah 1988). The rationale underlying this rule is 
that reliance on criminal conduct not resulting in a conviction 
could be unfairly prejudicial to a defendant because such reliance 
could tip the scales to a sentence of death when the defendant had 
never actually been proven to have committed the alleged crime. 
Id. at 1259. An analogous rationale, it would seem, applies to the 
instant case. If the court's sentencing decision rests on the 
unproven charges as stated in the information, defendant could well 
be unfairly prejudiced by receiving a punishment for an unproven 
and unadmitted crime. See State v. Womack, 319 N.W.2d at 19-20. 
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Considering such conduct j... ± sentencing decision :. therefore, 
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Defendant also argues that the tri al court. *« sentencing 
defe^dan* improperly relied TI • h^ -^ r-t - - identification i :.in , 
irpa.^ - e 
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POINT TWO 
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facts are that Jamie Barnhart, • co-
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held her. And this victim claims to have hnon 
multiply raped anally, vaginally a i J 
sodomized. That this woman was beaten about 
her face, and then she was left. 
(I ' 84-85), 
! I In Rprrimi instance, the court stated: 
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There are some inconsistencies in the 
statements of the defendant. There is not 
inconsistency in the fact that she was 
viciously and brutally beaten about her face 
and there was also evidence of her having been 
sexually assaulted. 
(R. 85). 
And, finally, the court stated: 
The offense was characterized by extreme 
cruelty or depravity. And I think holding 
someone down and multiply beating her or 
raping her, and that certainly falls in that 
category, and there are multiple charges here, 
and the defendant's attitude is not conducive 
to supervise [sic] in a less restrictive 
setting, I certainly agree with those 
aggravating circumstances in this case and 
feel that incarceration in the Utah State 
Prison is warranted and required under the 
circumstances. 
(R. 86). 
In the first instance, the court used the equivocal phrase, 
"this victim claims." In the second, the court stated, "there was 
also evidence." In the final instance, the court used the 
alternative "beating her or raping her" (emphasis added). In all 
three instances, the references to the sexual conduct could be 
omitted entirely and the reasonableness of the remaining part of 
the ruling would still be manifest. 
Absent these references or even if the court improperly 
considered this information, the court's ruling contains sufficient 
and appropriate reasons to sustain the sentence imposed. See State 
v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 912-13 (Utah 1988) (either one or two 
aggravating circumstances found by court were sufficient to support 
the sentence imposed); State v. Robison, 811 P. 2d 500, 504 (Idaho 
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3 - --mid s 
prescribed r\ i rcumstances, tre crurt 
did not abuse its discretion, and its sentence should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this |gday of June, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to Ronald 
S. Fujino and Charles F. Loyd, Jr., Attorneys for Defendant, 424 
East 500 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this /&_ day of June, 
1993. 
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MR. LOYD: And the Court will recall that that's 
also contained in the Defendant's Certificate and Statement 
and was part of the plea bargain. 
THE COURT: Is there any legal reason why sentence 
cannot be imposed at this time? 
MR. LOYD: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Harris, you have been found guilty 
of one Count of Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree Felony, 
and one Count of Atttempted Robbery, a Third Degree Felony. 
I have listened to what you said and the comments of your 
counsel• 
I'd first note, Mr. Harris, at the time that you 
entered your plea to both of those Counts I went over with 
you in great detail whether you were, in fact, guilty of 
those offenses. I think at this point to come into this 
Court at the time of sentencing and deny responsibility for 
the offenses you have admitted to does not serve you well at 
this time. 
What happened in this case is that the victim in 
this case, who was also transient, was brutally and viciously 
attacked. And the facts are that Jamie Barnhart, your 
co-defendant, and you approached this victim. She held her. 
And this victim claims to have been multiply raped anally, 
vaginally and sodomized. That this woman was beaten about 
0084 
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her face, and then she was left. And she identified you, 
Mr. Harris, as well as Miss Barnhart and also the other 
co-defendants, one of whom was prepared to testify against 
you and the other co-defendants. 
Also, the facts in this case as alleged by the 
victim are that before the preliminary hearing — and I hear 
what you say, Mr. Loyd that someone approached her and said 
that Red Bone says, If you don't go to court and testify, 
everything will be forgotten; if you do you'll get hurt. 
Then she indicated that she was going to have to testify and 
she was attacked and her leg was broken. 
That'8 what the victim alleges in this case. I 
understand that you deny it. 
And I accept what you say, Mr. Loyd. And I am 
going to, in the sentence the Court imposes, consider that 
and weigh that very heavily. That that's contrary to what 
she represented to you when you interviewed her. 
There are some inconsistencies in the statements 
of the defendant. There is no inconsistency in the fact that 
she was viciously and brutally beaten about her face and 
there was also evidence of her having been sexually 
assaulted. 
The recommendation of Adult Probation & Parole — 
first of all, based upon your criminal history ~ and 
sometimes I really don't understand how such a vicious crime 
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could come out with a recommendation for probation. But in 
any event, there is a recommendation by Adult Probation & 
Parole that the Court depart upward from the guidelines for 
the reasons that in their judgment Mr. Harris represents a 
serious threat of violent behavior, that the victim in this 
case was particularly vulnerable, that the injury to the 
person was unusually extensive. And I might add, also 
Mr. Harris had in his possession property belonging to the 
victim of the assault. 
The offense was characterized by extreme cruelty 
or depravity. And I think holding someone down and multiply 
beating her or raping her, and that certainly falls in that 
category, and there are multiple charges here, and the 
defendant's attitude is not conducive to supervise in a less 
restrictive setting, I certainly agree with those aggravating 
circumstances in this case and feel that incarceration in the 
Utah State Prison is warranted and required under the 
circumstances. 
Well, having said that, it is the judgment and 
sentence of this Court, Mr. Harris, that you be sentenced to 
the terms prescribed by law for each of these offenses, 
namely: zero to five years in the Utah State Prison for each 
offense. Also, I am aware that you don't have substantial 
funds available to you by any means in light of your 
lifestyle* And the fine, although clearly a greater fine 
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could be justified in this case, I don't think that one would 
make any sense because I don't think you have the ability to 
pay a greater fine. The Court orders that you pay a fine in 
the amount of $1,000 plus an 85 percent surcharge. That is 
consistent with the recommendation of Adult Probation & 
Parole• 
With regard to whether you should be — whether 
these sentences should be consecutive or concurrent, first of 
all I'd make a note that I don't think a 90-day diagnostic 
evaluation would serve any useful purpose in this case. And 
I very often consider that if the Court is willing to place 
someone on probation, and I do not feel that is warranted in 
this case. And I think that incarceration at the Utah State 
Prison is appropriate punishment, Mr. Harris. 
I think that this was a particularly vicious crime 
against someone who was very vulnerable. Multiple people 
attacking one person makes that victim even more vulnerable 
than usual. It seems to me, Mr. Harris, that the 
recommendation of Adult Probation & Parole is appropriate. 
And therefore, I am following that recommendation and 
sentencing you consecutively to the Utah State Prison. 
I am also going to order that you pay — be 
jointly and severally responsible for victim restitution for 
the injuries that she claims to have suffered. That is the 
judgment and sentence of the Court. 
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